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Abstract: The liberal order that prevailed in the West after the end of the Second World War has 
recently been challenged from within as much as by external forces. The liberal internationalism and 
liberal democratic politics that defined the idea of ‘The West’ is now threatened on several fronts: by 
insurgent politics, not least the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom; by economic and ideological 
challenges to its role as the singular paradigm of globalization; and most recently by unilateralism 
from the present incumbent of the White House. Turbulent politics raises serious questions about the 
capacity of the western liberal order to survive. Some commentators assert that to claim this is ‘crisis’ 
is exaggeration. Yet there is a case to answer.  
 
     The western liberal order is a compound of ideas and agency, institutions and shared 
values that sustain the liberal project and shape its politics. A system established by the 
victorious ‘united nations’ at the end of the Second World War to ensure sound money, 
facilitate free trade and other forms of commercial exchange. Complementary to these liberal 
economic goals was maintenance of global peace by mediating conflicts.1 The United 
Nations and its agencies were the principal global interlocutors, assisted by newly created 
European institutions designed to reconcile former enemies within a liberal and democratic 
order on the Continent that had long been the principal locus of war and conflict. Rebuilding 
a devastated Continent restored the national state as the primary agency of government and 
the fount of political allegiance and legitimacy, but with the statist architecture of the 
Westphalian system constrained by novel transnational institutions. 
     Common values sustained by this institutional fabric are the ethical ballast of the liberal 
international system John Ruggie described as ‘embedded liberalism’: free trade and open 
markets, justiciable human rights, the rule of law, civic culture and democratic governance.2 
Arrangements that underpinned a new social contract between free market capitalism and 
redistributive welfare, and intended to ameliorate the poverty and social injustice that pre-
1945 had given rise to extremist politics and total war. The post-war liberal order was the 
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culmination of the West’s long march from barbarism to civilization: moral and material 
progress rooted in the values of the European Enlightenment, the Reformation and latterly the 
technological and cultural achievements of the democratic and industrial revolutions of the 
eighteenth century and after. A process of liberal internationalism and social progress aptly 
described by Karl Polanyi as ‘The Great Transformation’, and characterized by later writers 
as the age of ‘modernity’.3 Lately however the idea of inexorable ‘progress’ central to this 
liberal narrative has faced serious challenge, although whether this amounts to existential 
crisis remains to be seen.4  
     The financial crash of 2008 had far-reaching consequences for the western liberal order, 
although there were stirrings of social anxiety over what some saw as disconnection between 
‘remote’ elites and the wider public even before this cataclysmic event. The fall-out from 
Washington’s unilateral decision to foreclose on the Bretton Woods machinery in 1971, 
followed by the inflationary rise in the spot price of oil in the aftermath of Yom Kippur war 
in1974 added to turbulence.  All of these events with cultural as much as political 
consequences for the post-war contract made between the political classes and peoples who 
had endured the Great Depression and the catharsis of world war. The European institutions 
contributed to peace and prosperity in Western Europe, the EC / EU as a full partner in the 
liberal order rather than merely a dependency of Washington. The late Tony Judt, hardly 
uncritical of the European idea, observed that ‘‘few would have predicted it sixty years 
before, but the 20th century might yet belong to Europe’’. Similarly, Rockwell Schnaebel, 
former American ambassador to the EU, proclaimed Europe as the ‘‘the rising power’’, and 
Mark Leonard likewise predicted that Europe rather than America would ‘‘run the 21st 
Century’’.5 Neither prediction remotely realised although hardly regarded as far-fetched at 
the time. Contemporary commenters are more circumspect about predicting European 
futures, with globalization often cited as the principal reason for declining public confidence 
in the western liberal order, not least the principal instigator of insurgent populist politics that 
challenges the liberal order and undermines democratic politics.6 There is widespread 
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disquiet over perceived disconnect between governors and governed, declining trust in elites 
and loss of faith in the tacit social contract, the ‘bargain’ made between elites and citizens in 
the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The western liberal order still prevails, 
although much less socially inclusive, and labelled by advocates and critics alike as ‘neo-
liberalism’.7 A marked shift away from social liberalism defined by its collective purpose and 
the commonweal, redistributive politics and policy replaced nowadays by what some describe 
as ‘possessive individualism.’8 
     The idea of ‘The West’ was always contested, an ambiguous construction and discourse 
even for its principal social constituencies, notwithstanding broadly shared values about the 
purposes of politics. The liberal international ‘order’ is now in question and on several levels: 
critiqued for lacking economic fairness and social justice, challenged by many who count 
themselves casualties of predatory corporatism. A transformation one historian describes as 
the ‘neo- liberal train’ set running by supply-side reforms associated with the 
individualization and marketization of the social economy that ‘‘began to (roll) cross Europe 
in 1989’’.9 The West is still contending with the consequences of these disruptive material 
changes and cultural shifts, with rising public dismay and even visceral anger directed at 
political elites, the governing parties of the centre-right and centre-left that adopted neo-
liberalism as their model for public policy. Mistrust in liberal politics that has contributed to 
insurgent politics and a changing political culture. A liberal constitutional order still prevails, 
based not only in law but also on cultural constraints and personal forbearance instilling 
habits and conventions of toleration and decency in politics. This civic and civil anchor is 
now under threat, moderation subverted by visceral politics, what  Ruth Ben-Ghiat calls a 
politics of ‘memory’ embedded in socially exclusive identities, a zero-sum politics no longer 
subject to liberal restraint and more amenable to extreme and sometimes to extremist 
predilections.10  
     Some commentators who celebrated the historic triumph of the liberal order after 
Communism’s collapse now write of ‘turbulence’ and some even of ‘existential’ crisis. 
Francis Fukuyama’s famous boast in 1992 that ‘‘liberal democracy remains the only coherent 
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political aspiration’’, his prediction of nothing less dramatic than the ‘end of history’ with 
‘The West’ as ‘the last man standing’ now seems merely hubris. Still ‘standing’ but on 
altogether less secure foundations, less confident of either purpose or destiny, confronted by 
unprecedented challenges from within as much as from without, not least from insurgent 
politics. Events confirm the incipient if not existential crisis of liberal politics. We focus here 
on three distinct yet connected issues. Firstly, the Brexit vote in the 2016 British referendum, 
an event that has far-reaching consequences, not only for EU-UK relations but also for the 
European idea and institutional architecture, a principal agency of liberal internationalism. 
The second challenge to the Western liberal order is the emergence of a vulgar and 
counterfactual politics, evidenced at every level of contemporary discourse and most 
spectacularly by the phenomenon of Trumpismo. An illiberal politics that trades in untruth 
and hyperbole, uses bombast and wilful manipulation, and falsifies hard evidence for malign 
purposes. The celebration of ‘fake news’, ‘alternative facts’ and scapegoating over measured 
debate, reasoned argument and evidence-based essential for democratic politics. The third 
challenge here is the rise of insurgent movements and parties ill disposed towards liberal 
politics and intent on subverting it. A politics driven by cultural anxiety and anger, directed 
primarily against what its activists regard as complacent and mendacious liberal elites, and 
drawing its political energy from visceral intolerance of ‘otherness’. The very antithesis of 
the cultural tolerance and social inclusivism that has defined liberal politics over the duration, 
with wilful disrespect for ‘others’, crude vilification and intimidation of opponents by means 
of cyber-bullying in the electronic public space that is now the principal arena for public 
engagement, and clear evidence of changing attitudes and conduct in contemporary politics.11 
     These developments raise serious questions about the capacity of the liberal order to 
respond to and even survive the insurgent challenge. How far are these challenges merely 
periodic discord that usually accompanies structural shifts, but over time in liberal societies 
accommodated and eventually resolved? Or are they evidence of imminent crisis, and if so 
how might, the western order recover political equilibrium and restore public confidence in a 
liberal democratic politics? 
 
 
                                                          
11 See for instance the illuminating but disheartening account of declining public and elite engagement in liberal 
politics in PETER MAIR, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy (Verso, London 2013). 
5 
 
1.BREXIT AND THE CHALLENGE TO LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM 
     The Brexit vote in the 2016 referendum is both a signal moment and symptom of 
declining public confidence in politics.12 What is Euroscepticism’s appeal for many voters in 
a country where politics and diplomacy has long been well disposed to liberal 
internationalism? The vote to ‘leave’ the EU certainly confounds this liberal legacy. A 
decision that reflects growing disquiet at the grass roots about cultural identity, especially 
amongst a constituency grown mistrustful, indeed hostile towards what is seen as a remote’ 
liberal elite, the latter a political class whose disconnection from the body politic is expressed 
as values and policy preferences that many ‘ordinary’ citizens disparage. For instance, multi-
culturalism, international development aid and human rights, European integration and open 
borders, and free trade rather than protecting jobs and ‘stemming the tide’ of immigration that 
depresses the price of labour and places unacceptable burdens on the welfare state. This 
nativist and insular outlook is changing both the discourse and culture of politics, and over 
time it has reduced the support base of the mainstream parties of government that represent 
these liberal preferences.  
     To what extent is Brexit a symptom of this anti-liberal malaise, or is it merely familiar 
British exceptionalism, predictable in a country that as Prime Minister May confirmed has 
never entirely comfortable with the European project, except as a common market.13  Or 
perhaps Brexit is collateral damage resulting from ideological wrangling in the Conservative 
party, a failed gamble by a lackadaisical Prime Minister Cameron desperate to save his party 
from civil war, and a vote he naively assumed he would carry off successfully?14 There is 
evidence to support each of these interpretations. For observers however, the referendum is 
something altogether more insidious than merely failed tactics, but rather conclusive evidence 
of a fundamental mood-change in British politics. Culture shift but one by no means confined 
to Britain, indeed working through the sociological fabric of contemporary politics 
throughout the West. Brexit in this narrative is but one of many instances of grass-roots 
insurgence against liberal politics by those who feel excluded, see themselves more ‘losers’ 
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than beneficiaries of remorseless globalization.15 A lacuna is clearly opening between 
governors and governed, elites and people and not only in Britain. Political allegiance and 
partisanship is no longer determined as it once was primarily by embedded cleavages based 
on social class, but increasingly by new claims on primordial and communal identity. 
Insidious change is loosening the affective glue that has held the liberal order together 
throughout long decades of modernity.16 Cultural anxieties are reconfiguring a politics 
previously denominated primarily by the materialist clash of left and right, as a post-material 
politics of belonging and identity about ‘who’ we are or at least who we ‘think’ we are. In 
short, there are altogether new claims now on political allegiance that reflect this 
transformation in the sociological base of party politics.17 
     The EU has become a target for those who are experiencing cultural anxieties, and not 
least in the United Kingdom, with ‘Europe’ a convenient scapegoat for discomfiting change. 
The EU has become a particular focus for rising anti-liberal and nativist sentiments. A 
lightening conductor for those angry about governance directed by supposedly rootless and 
geographically remote elites who prioritize the interests of corporate business and other 
special insider interests over those of ‘ordinary people’ such as organized labour or 
consumers. The ideological rationale for Single European Market as celebrated by Brussels is 
classically liberal and internationalist, and primarily favours the interests of global 
corporatism. As critics see it, the EU deploys free movement (of goods, services, money and 
people) and an integrated labour market as merely convenient cover for depressing wages and 
maximising corporate profits, an outcome radical economists describe as a ‘race to the 
bottom’.18 The idea of European interference in sovereign affairs compounds a deeper sense 
of historical detachment and cultural distance from ‘Europe’ amongst the British electorate. 
The end of Empire and subsequently industrial decline has given rise to a sense of cultural 
degeneration and latterly of national failure, predisposing many older mostly poorer and less 
cosmopolitan Britons to be more receptive to the dog-whistle politics of nativism that trades 
in infantile conspiracy theories about cultural miscegenation, or being ruled by foreigners in 
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Brussels. A situation exploited for what is mostly malign purposes by a xenophobic media 
that has always willfully misrepresented the EU. For many who voted ‘leave’, Brexit is an 
outward expression of insular and self-regarding nationalism, predictable response to 
supposed national decline. A familiar narrative that both exalts and exaggerates a ‘glorious’ 
past, soon to be ‘recovered’ as bountiful trade networks and global heft that will, according to 
its tribunes, restore national self-confidence and bring economic salvation.  
     The sociology of Brexit reveals why the decision to quit the EU was made and by whom. 
Many voters bought into the narrative of cultural exceptionalism, of a future best navigated 
by recreating the past. A sense of national precocity and self-reliance with widespread appeal 
in a country that has been a sovereign state with a distinct sense of its national identity since 
the later Middle Ages.19 Anxiety over ‘identity’ has given rise to a sense of cultural loss that 
the Brexit campaign was able to mobilise for its own purposes. A reactive, indeed a 
reactionary reflex that sociologist David Goodhart interprets as backlash against the liberal 
cosmopolitan values and cultural preferences. In effect, a cultural demarcation between 
nativists and metropolitans that echoes but does not exactly replicate the class divisions that 
once defined British politics. On one side a mostly younger, socially and geographically 
mobile and well educated demographic disposed to post-1960s post-material values: 
multiculturalism, multiple identities, metropolitan values and alternative life styles associated 
with post-national politics and post-capitalist society. People with  broader social horizons 
and better life chances, more at ease with change, comfortable with ‘otherness’, convinced 
about the benefits of free movement and open borders, the capacity to live, love, study, work 
across borders. People whose sense of personal ‘worth’ and cultural identity is by no means 
threatened, indeed enhanced by feeling connected to the wider world beyond the ‘merely’ 
national community, and who Goodhart categorizes as the ‘people from anywhere’. 
     The other side of this socio-cultural cleavage are the ‘people from somewhere’: a socially 
disadvantaged culturally parochial (mostly) white working class, who live either in rural 
backwaters or in the materially deprived inner cities and small towns of the English Midlands 
and the North. Communities where civic pride once flourished, work had been plentiful 
skilled and relatively well paid, and ‘foreigners’ rarely encountered. Denizens who in current 
sociological jargon feel neglected, ‘left behind’ by the metropolitanism of the capital city and 
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the cosmopolitanism of globalisation.20 A constituency that feels itself disenfranchised by a 
liberal elite preaching consensus politics and as such available for mobilisation by 
Eurosceptic insurgents and populist and nativist movements deploying a narrative of betrayal 
and grievance. A constituency and a political dynamic by no means confined to the United 
Kingdom, although the Brexit campaign has been its most spectacular outcome.  
     Movements trading on material and cultural anxieties are a feature of politics throughout 
the EU and in America too, where both alt-right and new left populism was a prominent 
feature of the 2016 presidential campaign.21 As such, Brexit is no outlier or isolated case, by 
no means an intermittent outcry from marginalized Britons with an inflated sense of historical 
exceptionalism. Similar rage is vented against America’s liberal elite – the so-called 
Washington ‘swamp’ - and for similar reasons by the people Hilary Clinton uncharitably 
dismissed as ‘deplorables’. These new insurgent movements are ‘of their time’ gaining 
political momentum and more insidious than merely intermittent political spasm. This is 
insurgent politics that vents political anger against mainstream parties and liberal politics and 
notably in Europe at the European institutions in ‘remote’ Brussels. A preference for cultural 
affinity over class solidarity or amorphous ideas about internationalism that appeal to 
ideologues or idealists rather more than to ordinary people are the ontological drivers or 
incitements to insurgent politics. This is not to say that the political culture of the liberal West 
by any means has reverted to xenophobia yet neither is the public mood any longer receptive 
to liberal internationalism. Rather, anxieties over cultural identity, about ‘who we are’ is 
reshaping if not yet replacing the ‘old’ binary politics of materialism over ‘who gets what’ 
and ‘how much’.22 A post-material or at least non-materialist politics is on the rise and with it 
an ideological narrative and political preferences that no longer reflect primary divisions and 
political attachments based on social class that were formerly the basis for political 
partisanship, ideological preference and party allegiance during the industrial age.23 
     An insurgent mood is evident throughout the West. Meanwhile, the liberal elite is in turn 
complacent or dismissive about the insurgent challenge, only latterly acknowledging the 
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problem but thus far without offering any convincing policy let alone ideological response. 
These sentiments were patent in the ‘leave’ vote, but Brexit cannot be neatly pigeon holed as 
nativist reflex or populist twitch. Populist angst at disconnected elites is only part of the 
explanation. Even mainstream voters who occupy the liberal centre-ground of politics are 
concerned about exponential loss of sovereignty, too many policy competencies transferred 
from national government to transnational governance in Brussels. Moreover, the claim by 
the liberal and mostly governing elite that globalisation requires yet more European 
integration, has given rise to ‘soft’ variant of Euroscepticism that appeals even to moderate 
voters, and is by no means confined to British voters. Brexit then has many causes, is by no 
means a singular event whose underlying modus vivendi is restricted to an offshore island. 
Explaining its logics is now a thriving academic industry, yet resolving its challenges with a 
view to restoring public confidence in liberal politics is quite another matter. How might the 
insurgent mood and mind-set that is driving Brexit be contained and public confidence in the 
liberal international be restored, or is the situation beyond recovery? What eventual outcome 
for Brexit will inflict least damage on the EU and its role as a mainstay of a rules-based 
liberal international order?  
     The best outcome would surely be a ‘soft’ Brexit that averts the likely crisis of Britain 
‘crashing out’ of the EU without any arrangements in place for continuing trade relations and 
other forms of co-operation with erstwhile partners. Yet as things currently stand, the 
likelihood of such an outcome is declining. A year and more after the withdrawal 
negotiations began, little of substance has been resolved. Periodic diplomatic encounters in 
Brussels, whilst settling preliminary issues such as Britain’s residual ‘debts’ and the rights of 
EU citizens residing in post-Brexit Britain have failed to reach agreement on the critical 
issues, principally the terms of future trading relations. There are divisions in both camps as 
much as between them, but mostly on the British side and not least in the governing 
Conservative party, about what sort of Brexit and how best to realise it. The intransigent 
Eurosceptic wing of the Conservative party remains impervious to compromise, preferring to 
quit the EU without a trade deal, rather than compromise on what it regards as the 
fundaments of national sovereignty.  
     Meanwhile, EU negotiators stand firm, not so much out of malice but determined to drive 
a hard bargain on the ‘divorce’ terms in order to deter future secessions. There is little 
outright malice on the EU side, although a view exists in the Brussels institutions and some 
Member States too that Brexit is an opportunity to ‘punish’ what are seen as ‘arrogant’ 
10 
 
Britons for turning their backs on Europe communautaire. Others see Brexit as a convenient 
opportunity to rid the Union of the British albatross, London as perennial naysayer and 
impediment to future treaty reforms, as it has been in previous IGCs since Maastricht.24 There 
is some regret on the EU side over an historic rift seen as further weakening the European 
liberal order. Certainly, a negotiated outcome will require compromises on both sides. 
Whether the respective negotiators possess the strategic vision to deliver a damage-limiting 
outcome remains to be seen. What is apparent so far is reticence on both sides over 
compromising entrenched ‘red lines’. For the British, a ‘bespoke’ outcome that will recover 
national sovereignty, deliver on the mandate of the referendum vote to ‘take back control’ of 
trade policy, but which necessarily precludes free movement of labour into Britain and avoids 
continuing jurisdiction of the ECJ. An outcome that Brussels rejects outright and according to 
its own red lines as merely ‘cherry picking’ and as such compromising the singularity of a 
comprehensive single market.   
     In the negotiations to date, the EU has resisted making any concession that compromise 
what it regards as the integrity of the ‘four freedoms’. Meanwhile the EU’s status and role in 
the international order are attenuated and a consequence of dilatory responses to recent crises. 
Respect and trust from its own citizens has markedly declined since the global financial and 
Euro-zone crises, further depleted since 2015 by inept handling of the migration crisis.25   
Growing disaffection is not a consequence of Brexit per se rather Brexit is a mirror to public  
disquiet with liberal politics and the political class who have presided over affairs since the 
War’s end. A salutary lesson to what can happen when liberal elites becomes detached from 
their political base.26 How effectively have the liberal order and its functionaries responded to 
insidious populist challenge? On the available evidence, not convincingly enough, with 
failure all round to reassure those anxious about remorseless globalization, and who are 
mostly underwhelmed by the efforts of governing elites intent on implementing their neo-
liberal policy preferences. The one-size fits all (or one size fits none) statist approach to 
macro-economic management that characterizes western public policy is nowadays widely 
disparaged. A style of political management (or rather mis-management) that prefers ‘top-
                                                          
24 JENNIFER RANKIN et al, EU parliament leader: we want Britain out as soon as possible, The Guardian 
(London) 24 June 2016.  
25 See the results of a survey on public attitudes to governance in Europe conducted between 2008-15, Public 
Integrity and Trust in Europe, European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building (ERCAS), 
Hertie School of Governance, Berlin 2015. 
26 ANDREJ NOSKO, Facing Europe’s Crisis of Alienation and Mistrust, Open Society Foundations, May 2017, 




down’ transnational and technocratic governance conducted opaquely in the corporatist and 
technocratic arena of public-private power, and increasingly beyond the ‘hollowed out’ 
national state.  
     Something will surely have to give between these positions in extremis if a workable 
agreement on British withdrawal is to be negotiated, and indeed if faith in the European idea 
is to be recovered. With time fast running out, the hunch of many close observers is that ‘no 
deal’ is the most likely outcome, and with it negative externalities for all concerned. If an 
acrimonious rupture does occur over Brexit, Europe will become materially poorer and 
strategically weakened. The only beneficiary from such estrangement between London and 
EU27 will be Putin’s Moscow, or indeed the Trump Administration that sees a strong EU as 
more enemy than ally or neighbour, both ‘superpowers’ for the most part preferring Europe 
to be materially reduced and strategically marginalized in international affairs. Some in 
Brussels see this as a signal moment and are prepared to abandon the United Kingdom to its 
fate, to suffer the consequences of what they see as self-inflicted isolationism the sooner to 
restore a flagging EU project. Yet an outcome that would almost certainly be as harmful to 
the EU27 as it would be to the United Kingdom. As such a démarche that is avoidable but 
only if the final negotiations are conducted and on both sides with forbearance.  
     There is mutual advantage from a negotiated outcome that avoids disorderly Brexit. 
Negotiations between democratic and liberal states are rarely zero sum, certainly not if the 
parties want to continue to trade, to cohabit in a common space and a region adjacent to the 
turbulent Eurasia neighbourhood. Add to this the patent threat from terrorism, energy 
insecurity, climate change and other environmental hazards, as well as demographic 
imbalance, lagging productivity and declining competitiveness compared with younger more 
innovative economic rivals, and there is every reason to seek compromise, notwithstanding 
that the United Kingdom is more demandeur than défendeur in these negotiations. Whether 
Brexit has been a wake-up call for conceited European elites however is debateable.  
     How might the EU respond better to the challenges of Brexit? Some amongst the Brussels 
elite and not least convinced federalists such as Jean-Claude Juncker and Guy Verhofstadt, 
prescribe yet ‘more’ Europe, still ‘deeper’ integration, even a fully federalUnion.27 There are 
already plans for the next, and its advocates hope irreversible stage of the European project. 
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Juncker for instance proposes a single EU executive presidency, a larger budget covering 
more policy domains and managed by an EU finance minister. Something akin to a European 
army or at least a more co-ordinate defence capability is also under consideration and 
likewise ‘enhanced’ decision-making in the Council by extending QMV.28 Germany’s SPD 
has gone still further, advocating a constitution as the blueprint for a federalized United 
States of Europe, regardless of an earlier and botched attempt to deliver just such an 
outcome.29  
     Ideological prescription is one thing practical politics, what can actually be delivered that 
will work is quite something else. A federal EU may well enhance political careers, possibly 
improve inter-institutional decision-making, but it is unlikely to close the democracy deficit 
or to resonate with voters who have increasingly lost trust in a disconnected political class 
they see as out of touch with their immediate concerns. The current public mood is altogether 
more cautious than favourable to ‘ever closer’ integration. Wiser counsels are certainly aware 
of the shortcomings from putting ideology or at least well-intentioned idealism before 
practical politics. President Macron, for instance, in his Sorbonne speech (September 2017) 
proposed a more flexible EU governance with legitimacy ultimately residing with the 
Member States rather than the remote political centre in Brussels.30 Might the impasse in 
Brexit negotiations perhaps inject some much-needed realism into the expectations of the 
respective parties and ensure a positive-sum post-Brexit Europe that everyone can live with?  
     The European project and the liberal instincts that gave rise to it are recoverable, but only 
if common sense and practicable politics prevails over fanciful design. The task of 
reconfiguring ‘Europe’ is daunting but this Continent has overcome seemingly impossible 
challenges before, not least non pareil reconstruction that replaced the anarchy of total war 
with a rules-based liberal order. Classic federal architecture is no solution for remaking EU 
governance post-Brexit. A better option by far for recovering public trust, restoring 
confidence in the conduct of European affairs is to rebalance the project through the agency 
of the national state. To set aside the familiar top-down federalist predilections, replacing 
them with a design that promises ‘better Europe’: greater accountability, more transparent 
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decision-making by the limited pooling of sovereignty, drawing on the political capital and 
utilizes the administrative ‘know-how’ of functioning historic states. An architecture for 
governance that puts tried and tested agencies of national governments at the centre of the 
Union’s decisional processes, the nation state as the principal repository of accountable and 
democratic governance, and no less so the principal and the legitimate conduit between 
citizens and Brussels technocrats.  
     National parliaments after all are the most reliable agency for representing and voicing the 
popular will, notwithstanding declining electoral turnout. A federalist design that lacks a 
shared political culture, meaningful cultural solidarities, and a common language in which to 
conduct a conversation and facilitates what is political participation and usually described 
demos, would surely be a recipe for even greater political instability. Federations have a 
chequered history and have often been volatile arrangements: normatively prescribed by 
elites as the means for politically managing cultural diversity, but more often than not the 
cause of capricious politics unless balanced by a degree of primordial attachment and a sense 
of shared history that is presently lacking in the European Union. 
     One imaginative scheme for ‘balancing’ (rather than ‘reconciling’) national with common 
interests in EU governance post-Brexit commissioned by the influential Bruegel think-tank 
proposes flexible decisional procedures as the only effective basis for future European co-
operation. The report starts from the premise that a bad Brexit will do more harm than good 
in Europe,  observing that: ‘‘in an increasingly volatile world, neither the EU nor the United 
Kingdom have an interest in a divorce that diminishes their influence as the balance of 
economic power shifts away from the North-Atlantic world.’’ The authors propose ‘‘a new 
form of collaboration’’, a continental partnership that would ensure continuing trade in 
goods, services, with capital mobility and some temporary labour mobility, ‘‘within an 
intergovernmental frame-work based on common rules to protect the homogeneity of the 
deeply European integrated market.’’31 Much less a prescription for a hierarchic political 
design than an altogether looser arrangement of concentric circles, the inner core consisting 
of a supranational EU and the euro area, and an outer circle of countries involved in a 
structured intergovernmental partnership. By no means an original construction, indeed one 
frequently prescribed for a Continent with variable commitment to transnational co-operation 
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purposes. In this case, an architecture consisting of ‘concentric circles’ that complements the 
interests of both the UK and the EU: not the ‘one size fits all’ design of the federalist 
prospectus, but a more flexible intergovernmental or confederal arrangement that corresponds 
with the concept of Europe à la carte proposed by Macron in his Sorbonne speech.  A co-
operative design that he thought might even persuade the Eurosceptical British back into the 
European fold, or at least remain as close partners. 
 
2. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: IS TRUMPISMO THE END OF ATLANTICISM? 
     The election in 2016 of a populist non-politician to the American presidency is further 
challenge to the Western liberal order. How serious a challenge will depend on how close is 
the match between campaign bombast and actual policy. After some eighteen months in 
office, the signals here are mixed, but with sufficient evidence of capricious, even erratic 
behaviour to cause anxiety to Atlanticists for whom the USA remains the mainstay of shared 
values and strategic interests that has been the cultural ballast of the very idea of ‘The West’. 
Close relations and common interests that are under challenge now from Washington, if not 
yet seriously threatened with rupture. One persistent irritant here is Trump’s habitual 
complaint about European ‘free-riding’, the over-reliance of rich European countries on 
American taxpayers for funding the Continent’s security, closely followed by his objection to 
what he sees as unwonted trade protectionism that recently prompted him to describe the EU 
as a ‘foe’ to US trade. This trenchant criticism came at the 2018 NATO summit in Brussels 
where Trump’s irascible demeanor once again called into question the future of the Alliance, 
both as a shared cultural and as a security and trade partnership, with NATO and the WTO as 
its principal agencies.  
     How potent is the threat to common transatlantic purpose, indeed to the very idea of the 
West itself and to the liberal values that define it? 32As with Brexit a case can be made that 
this is more exceptional occurrence than existential threat. A president like none before him, 
an outlier of the kind democracy occasionally throws into the mix. On this benign reading, 
Trumpismo is momentary challenge more than serious threat to transatlantic relations. As 
some commentators see it - and as Max Weber famously observed - the imperative in serious 
politics is to ‘bore the hard boards’, confront head on the existential demands of office: not 
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least, to reconcile excessive campaign rhetoric with political realities, to seek accommodation 
of differences and reach common sense outcomes.33 This ‘normalisation’ narrative is familiar 
in transatlantic discourse, sees tensions as merely occasional discord, more ‘rift’ than 
irrevocable ‘drift’ and for which there are many antecedents.34 Or is it something deeper, 
evidence perhaps of cultural dissonance and clashing interests, increasingly fractious if not 
yet fractured relations?   
     Atlanticism was always a constructed narrative that aligns quite different and occasionally 
competing preferences, albeit subsumed under a broadly shared commitment to defend 
common values. Rooted ontological preferences and the ideological narratives that justify 
them can and do change, and the sudden end of the Cold War did encourage both sides of the 
Alliance to undertake strategic review and even cultural reappraisal of what the West actually 
means. A security arrangement constructed on the basis of a common response to geo-
political circumstances in post-bellum Europe, albeit one sustained more by the pragmatic 
imperative for mutual security as much as cultural symmetry, notwithstanding that 
commitment to shared ‘Western values’ does feature in the Alliance’s ideological raison 
d’etre. From the start, the idea of the West has implied cultural adjacency as well as merely 
realpolitik, but in reality more between patron and clients than as partners. For Europeans, 
dependence both material and strategic to ensure security against a putative Communist 
threat: for the USA the imperative for a buffer zone, Europe as first line of homeland defence 
against geo-political threat. Differences and discordance were apparent almost from the start, 
and though never quite reaching ‘crisis’ point has made for occasionally problematic 
relations. Before the demise of Soviet power, and with it the emergence of an entirely 
reconfigured and multipolar world order caused Washington to accelerate reassessment of 
strategic priorities.35  
     Transatlantic tensions occurred during the Cold War years, but more pianissimo than 
fortissimo. The refusal for instance of European governments to offer diplomatic, let alone 
provide even token military support for what Washington regarded as containment of 
international communism in Vietnam. This rebuff was a turning point in Atlantic relations, if 
not yet critical disjunction. Transatlantic tensions grew more pronounced after 1989. 
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Euphoria over  the ‘triumph of the West’, notwithstanding, mutual agreement to fill the 
strategic vacuum by underpinning still fragile regional democracy through  NATO expansion 
and EU enlargement merely served to accentuate differences over the pace and direction of 
these mutual commitments. A notable example was President Clinton’s exasperation over 
Europe’s failure to resolve the regional crisis following the collapse of the former 
Yugoslavia. A diplomatic débâcle that eventually obliged Washington to take military action, 
albeit with British support and under NATO auspices to restore political order in what 
Washington regarded as entirely a regional responsibility. The critical moment by far was the 
fall-out over America’s unilateral response to the 9/11 attack. After initial expressions of 
transatlantic solidarity, Washington’s relations with leading EU counties rapidly deteriorated, 
culminating in unprecedented crisis after leading EU states and NATO members including 
Germany and France refused to endorse military action against Iraq ‘identified’ by 
Washington as the principal perpetrator of the attack on the American homeland. Secretary of 
State for Defence, Donald Rumsfeld confirmed an historic post-war low in transatlantic 
relations when he made pointed distinction between Europe ‘old’ and ‘new’. The latter 
consisting mainly of new transition states in East / Central Europe, dependent on America for 
security and seen as reliable allies: and ‘old’ Europe, whose complacent leaders had reneged, 
as Rumsfeld saw it, on their moral and strategic obligations to support generous and 
dependable American allies.36  
     These events confirmed an Alliance facing growing discord: on one side, Europeans 
asserting greater autonomy from hyper-power America, the latter determined to reassess even 
its closest relations and to reorder strategic priorities. As such, an historic moment and 
turning point for the West setting in motion strategic revision well before the present and 
unruly incumbent’s tenure. Present turbulence in transatlantic relations may be more 
pronounced than usual but fractious relations are merely continuation of a trend established in 
the post-Cold War years, if a melodrama playing in a higher key. A trend then and not merely 
contingent occurrence, although Trump has taken the narrative of ingratitude further than any 
recent predecessor.37  
     Washington’s current angst over what Trump sees as blatant protectionism of the 
European Single Market is another contentious issue for transatlantic relations. A key 
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element of his mission to ‘Make America Great Again’, and recently elevated into ‘tit for tat’ 
trade war with mutual imposition of sanctions. Central to this nativist narrative are 
assumptions of wilful European ingratitude for American security cover, ‘free riding’ and 
‘failure to pay a ‘fair share’ of the cumulate costs of regional defence. Although the actual 
costings cited in this acrimonious exchange are accounted quite differently on either side, the 
fact is that this issue is now high on the transatlantic agenda. Events that by no means signify 
the end of strategic partnership, but singly and cumulatively make for problematic relations. 
Commentators now deliberate over what if anything of substance unites these allies: whether 
continuing fall-outs are merely the ‘narcissism of small differences’, minor irritants that 
occur in any close relations, or whether what was once merely Atlantic ‘drift’ is becoming 
unbridgeable ‘rift’, bringing closer the end of the West.38  
     What does the present fall-out signify for transatlantic relations and is there a reasonable 
prospect for recovering what Steinberg calls an ‘elective partnership’? 39 The signs are hardly 
encouraging after a sequence of events that confirm Trump’s preference for discordant 
unilateralism. The principal irritants and barely eighteen months into the incumbent’s first 
term are inter alia: American withdrawal from the 2015 Paris climate change accord adopted 
by international consensus; relocation to Jerusalem of the America’s embassy in Israel; 
rescinding the Iran nuclear accord negotiated in part under EU auspices; unilateral imposition 
of trade tariffs on the EU and raising barriers to free trade and investment flows.40 The 
Europeans have mostly responded to presidential vitriol with polite restraint, rather more in 
sorrow than anger. Taken at face value Trump’s approach to European diplomacy is to say 
the least more mordant than moderate, reactive more than reflective, instinctual rather than 
considered. Frequent and mostly spontaneous outbursts in the twitter-sphere or off the cuff 
pronouncements, and usually recanted later after lobbying by the State Department and as 
such poor substitute for constructive diplomacy. If by any stretch of the term this is ‘policy’, 
it hardly coincides with considered deliberations by Washington’s professional foreign policy 
community and indeed seen as conspicuously unhelpful by policy wonks, mostly in the State 
Department, the Pentagon and the security agencies. While there is undoubted and rising 
‘threat’ to the West, its liberal values and democratic institutions, Trump’s preference for  
‘fortress America’ rhetoric and for confrontation over considered diplomacy collides head-on 
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with Europe’s continuing strategic preference for a constructive partnership with its powerful 
ally. To that extent, Trumpismo undoubtedly makes for fraught transatlantic relations and 
threatens the liberal internationalism that has informed strategic thinking and diplomacy on 
both sides of the Atlantic since 1945. The critical question is how serious a threat and is the 
situation recoverable? 41 
     As for deeper impact, much will depend on the whether the incumbent’s propensity for ad 
hoc policy-making can be constrained, his nativist instincts and unilateralist preference 
curbed by Washington’s pragmatic and experienced policy community. Can this insurgent 
Head of State be brought to a more informed understanding of both the realities and the 
constraint of public power at the disposal of even the global hyper-power in today’s multi-
polar world? 42 The present impasse in transatlantic relations is recoverable, but only if 
Trump curbs his insurgent instincts and assumes the role of leader of the West his 
predecessors without exception signed up to.43 The fault for present transatlantic impasse is 
by no means entirely on the American side. The Europeans too have their own strategic blind 
spots, even as their leverage on a more powerful ally remains limited. Frequent complaint 
from Washington, whoever occupies the White House about rich economies and supposedly 
‘liberal’ countries imposing restrictions on free trade, refusing to carry (and pay for) their fair 
share of the regional and global security burdens are reasonable criticisms, but remediable. 
Realism and forbearance are required from the European side too. Recent proposals from the 
European federalists about meeting the urgent security challenge by establishing a 
distinctively pan-European security agency is both unrealistic and even dangerous, because it 
threatens the West’s security architecture in what is an increasingly dangerous world. A 
useful complement to western security in so far as it complements existing cover, but wholly 
unrealistic and improvident as a freestanding defence agency that might undermine NATO 
solidarity.44  
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     Some commentators doubt whether an independent European security capability is 
politically prudent, let alone a feasible alternative to America’s strategic role in European 
defence. The EU has made a tentative start on improving its strategic capability. Some 25 EU 
Member States (with only Denmark, Malta and the United Kingdom abstaining) have agreed 
closer security co-operation arrangements with a budget for research and procurement of 
matériel under the enhanced co-operation procedure and known as Permanent Security Co-
operation (PESCO). However, an arrangement intended to complement and not to compete 
with NATO.45 Meanwhile, Washington’s singular preference is for the European allies to 
increase their defence spend, contribute more manpower and matérial, undertake more of the 
heavy lifting in combined NATO operations, and commit to extending the alliance’s strategic 
remit to include‘ out of area’ operations. These security preferences are by no means 
inconsistent or conflictual, indeed most EU governments are supportive in principle of this 
twin-track solution to collective western security and this is surely the best way forward.  
     What is apparent from this febrile debate between transatlantic allies is that both sides still 
have far more in common than divides them. The cement that binds the Atlantic community 
is the shared realisation of insidious challenges to mutual purpose and common values in the 
near and far abroad, those founding principles on which the idea of ‘The West’ was 
established. Revanchist Russia more than unilateralist America, Moscow’s intention to assert 
its reviving power in a region of the Continent it regards as its own historic space is the 
primary concern and strategic driver of transatlantic discourse, or it should be. Proxy wars in 
the Ukraine, renewed tension in the Baltics, interference in democratic elections throughout 
the West and destabilising public life and free enterprise by baleful misuse of cyberspace 
threatens the very ‘idea’ of the West as a safe space for liberal democratic politics, free trade 
and open markets. Recent transatlantic fall-outs notwithstanding, the imperative for the West 
is to combat threat by summoning concerted allied purpose in a power play reminiscent of the 
Cold War. This is an ideological stand-off as much as a strategic confrontation and with a 
familiar opponent, the West confronting critical challenges to its values, politics and 
institutions from the same quarter, whatever Moscow’s current ideological alter ego.46  This 
is a familiar challenge to Western values, and no less so to regional security. This discourse is 
concentrating minds amongst the professional commentariat in the academy and the policy 
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community on the imperative of maintaining the West as a safe space for liberal values and 
democratic politics. Accordingly, Brexit and the Trumpismo phenomenon are both critical 
challenges in as much as they both threaten to weaken the West’s co-ordinate response to the 
insurgent challenge.  
     Another issue with adverse consequences for public trust in liberal politics is mass 
migration into the EU space, a consequence of political dislocation and economic turbulence 
in the near abroad. This has ratchetted cultural anxiety in the receiving countries and it plays 
to the nativist narrative of insurgent parties whose principal appeal is to cultural identity and 
defence of ‘homeland’. Yet more corroboration of putative threat as populist parties choose to 
interpret it to voters as ‘betrayal’ by elites who prefer to indulge moral abstraction such as 
human rights or multiculturalism than to defend public and national interests. Moreover, 
traded by these parties as threats to homeland security because these ‘uninvited’ incomers are 
predominantly Muslims from war zones in the near abroad, their migration westwards 
wilfully misconstrued to anxious publics as likely cover for terrorist infiltration. The EU and 
some of its Member States have struggled to strike a reasonable balance between the legal 
obligations and moral commitments required of any liberal international actor and respond 
prudently to hostility from voters, and even from some governments over what many see as 
‘typically’ liberal compassion in the face of putative threat. So far, there been no workable 
solution to managing the EU border, with the greatest pressures falling on a small number of 
states on the southern Mediterranean rim.   
     There can no effective solution to any of the challenges discussed here, unless the EU and 
its departing Member are prepared to co-operate closely together and with Washington to 
find feasible solutions to daunting challenges. In the case of  Brexit, this means negotiated 
compromise, avoiding the simplistic ‘remedies’ of fanciful sovereigntists, whereby ‘taking 
back control’ is merely code for disengagement from mainland Europe, nostalgic embrace of 
‘splendid isolation’.47 Solution to the present predicament of the West also implies making 
greater efforts to maintain that degree of transatlantic co-operation that has sustained the 
Atlantic since the end of the Second World War. Whether these challenges can be 
accommodated, trade-offs made between competing strategic priorities that currently divide 
the West will determine the Alliance’s future in a mutable global order. The Atlantic 
                                                          






‘partnership’ has undergone significant changes as to strategic preferences and on both sides 
since the end of the Cold War. The USA remains, for the time being at least, the only global 
hyper-power, and as such an indispensable player in defence of western power and 
influence.48 At the same time, American leadership, its role as arsenal, economic engine and 
diplomatic interlocutor with the wider world is more uncertain now than at any time since 
1945.49 There is nothing new about American hegemony vis a vis the European allies, but 
how that leadership is exercised, in whose interest and for what common purposes is key to 
maintaining enduring and mutually beneficial transatlantic relations in uncertain times as it 
has been from the outset.  
 
3. ELITE DISCONNECT, PUBLIC DISCONTENT AND INSURGENT POLITICS   
     Insurgent parties pursuing a medley of populist, far-right nativist and Eurosceptic 
preferences is another challenge to the liberal and democratic politics that have defined the 
West since the wars end.50 How much of a threat and whether it can be averted is a matter of 
debate. Public trust in democratic politics is essential for the future stability of the liberal 
order.51  Widespread disquiet with remote governance is on the rise, democracy deficits, and 
dominance of public policy at both the domestic and EU levels by unelected technocrats who 
resist due accountability and proper scrutiny, amenable to insider lobbying that privileges the 
interests of the few over the many than as supposed guardians of the wider public interest.  
     The European Union is a particular focus for such criticism. Successive treaties have 
installed convoluted governance and for many citizens ‘Brussels’ represents an impenetrable 
and incomprehensible technocracy: ‘multi-level’ governance that lacks meaningful 
legitimacy, or that much resembles representative democracy.52 Similar criticism is levelled 
too at the national state, geographically closer to its citizens than more remote EU 
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institutions, but widely disparaged as a ‘hollowed out’ administrative space where real power 
and effective influence are monopolized by special ‘insider’ interests. These criticisms have 
mobilized support for populist politics 53 How then to reduce public perceptions of disconnect 
between governors and governed is crucial then for restoring confidence in liberal politics.54  
     Disdain for ‘remote’ governance is by no means the only issue here.55 Cultural anxiety is 
likewise a significant driver of insurgent politics, the perception that liberal elites govern 
according to normative preferences and values that reflect ‘otherness’ (multiculturalism, 
open-borders, global markets, human rights observance well disposed towards asylum and 
migration) rather than in the ‘national’ interest.56 How serious is the challenge from insurgent 
parties and movements, whether of the populist left or the nativist right, and how should 
those who conduct the affairs of the liberal order respond? Is this merely temporary disorder, 
contingent response to material loss following the financial crash, or is it insidious threat to 
liberal politics?57 The longitudinal data necessary for addressing what is a quite recent 
development is mostly lacking. The 2014 European elections marked a signal moment when 
insurgent (both populist and nativist) parties made breakthrough of sorts, and in a handful of 
countries even a spectacular showing in the polls. Some commentators had predicted far-
reaching electoral turbulence, and in the event some of these parties did perform beyond even 
their own expectations, but overall results were rather more mixed, with a clear majority of 
voters continuing in these and in subsequent general elections to support mainstream and pro-
EU parties, and by some considerable margin.  
     More recently, insurgent parties – by no means a singular party type and covering a broad 
spectrum of ideological preferences, albeit mostly hostile to liberal politics – have made more 
headway, in some cases polling well even in first order or general elections, where voters 
customarily resist registering a protest vote and choose what they see as a party of 
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government.58 That said, the established parties of government for the most part continue to 
dominate the electoral landscape, notwithstanding more frequent successes by insurgents in 
national polls. Residual partisan allegiance by voters and respect for the norms, procedures 
and institutions of liberal democracy has mostly kept this challenge in check, yet there are 
nevertheless unsettling signs of a growing challenge to liberal politics and parties.59 Recent 
general elections everywhere from the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Austria, and even in 
the traditionally progressive Netherlands and Scandinavia has seen insurgent parties make 
serious inroads into the support base of mainstream parties, both of centre-right and centre-
left. A timely warning of a populism that might well become ‘normal’ politics, if the 
established parties ignore anxieties stirring at the grassroots of politics. More concerning still 
is the presence in the final run-off in the 2017 French presidential election of political 
ingénues replacing the two traditional parties of government, one representing the nativist 
far-right the other a populist movement that had never contested a national election centre-
left. Perhaps even more so the sudden rise of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland, its 
success in the German Bundestag elections of 2017 in a country whose brutal past had 
seemingly been a reliable cultural deterrent to political extremism.  
     Evidence of declining support for liberal and centrist politics is patent across the 
Continent, some of it increasing withdrawal from the public space as outright contempt. 
Persistently high abstention rates amongst younger and older voters alike, both cohorts that 
feel socially marginalized and materially neglected, confirms that increasing numbers of 
voters are unconvinced by the performance, competence and integrity of the usual parties of 
government. Electoral and other survey data confirms a downward trend in electoral turnout 
and increasing electoral volatility amongst those who do vote, and well as a significant 
reduction in political participation and party membership. All of these indirect indices of 
widespread public disaffection with conventional parties and mainstream politics that for 
many citizens  connotes declining confidence in a liberal politics and institutional order many 
feel has reneged on its historic post-war social contract with citizens.60 How should we 
interpret these shifts? We should certainly avoid hyperbole and exaggeration, whilst resisting 
                                                          
58 MATTHIJS ROODUIJN, What unites the voter bases of populist parties? Comparing the electorates of 15 
populist parties, European Political Science Review, 1-18 2017, pp.1-18. 
59 MARGARET MACMILLAN, Stability and democracy in Europe will hold fast against populism  
Respect for the rule of law will overcome any chance of a return to the Weimar era, Financial Times (London), 
October 21 2016. 
60 R. J. DALTON, Democratic challenges, democratic choices: The erosion of political support in advanced 
industrial democracies (Oxford 2004). 
24 
 
complacency. Some commentators highlight headline figures, but ignore the altogether more 
sinuous context of quotidian politics, drawing conclusions that too often lack balance or 
overlook the compound behavioural motivations and affective meaning of insurgent politics. 
Generalizing from random statistics or occasional case studies, selectively interpreting 
aggregate voting patterns that, while confirming rising volatility in politics and registering the 
facts of partisan de-alignment, says little about its underlying demographic or sociological 
significance. There is little in aggregate polling data to suggest that the insurgent mood is 
merely temporary or that it will soon evaporate. On the contrary, populist parties are making 
electoral headway across the Continent and beyond. 61 Evidence that confirms established 
parties are out of touch with their social base. At the same time, this on its own is hardly 
incontrovertible evidence of a terminal crisis for liberal politics. The overall trajectory of 
political change is altogether more mixed and nuanced. 62   
     One factor that should serve as warning to liberals everywhere is the success of some of 
these parties in securing a foothold in government. Comparatively few insurgent parties have 
managed to make the transition into parties of government even as junior coalition partners, 
but there are some instances where that important breakthrough has occurred. Most notably 
Austria’s APÖ and Italy’s Lega, both far-right parties and the Italian populist 5Star 
Movement, and there are other parties close to doing so even in conspicuously liberal 
political cultures such as Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, and with an upbeat 
performance by the Front National in recent national elections in France. Even more 
disconcerting perhaps for the future of the liberal order and its moderate politics is the extent 
to which some mainstream centrist parties have responded to insurgent challenge by adopting 
some populist preferences, and not least Euroscepticism, anti-immigration and neo-nativist 
identity politics. Some establishment parties of both left and right have incorporated 
nationalist rhetoric into their electoral offer in an attempt to shore up a declining electoral 
base against insurgent challenge. A cynical move and a dangerous concession to populist 
instincts and over time one that might dramatically change the narrative of party politics and 
further erode the cultural foundations of liberal centrist politics.63  
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     A balanced account of the state of contemporary politics should avoid hyperbole and focus 
on median conclusions. Whether centrist parties can reconnect with their anyway 
demographically shrinking social base is critical for the future of progressive politics in the 
West. Mark Lilla who describes himself as a ‘disillusioned liberal’ criticises centrist 
liberalism for forsaking those familiar solidarities of class and nation that was its electoral 
base and once firmly located in the middle ground of western politics, until social and 
economic turbulence consequent on deindustrialization, post-materialism and contested 
identities after the 1960s began to erode those constituencies. Lilla disparages what he sees as 
liberalism’s response to social change and cultural shift, headlong liberal retreat into the 
narrow byways of fissiparous ‘identity’ politics. Change that amounts to the evacuation of the 
public square and with it betrayal of former overarching ideological narratives by mainstream 
parties who now put esoteric and parochial causes ahead of universal values. Those rooted 
narratives of collective action and out-reaching ‘solidarities’ that were the basis of a 
progressive mass politics at the apogee of the liberal age in the mid-twentieth century. A 
strategy too that has cut these once great movement-based parties adrift from their 
foundational ideological constituencies, the social constituencies that were the historic source 
of their political capital, the base for their claim to compete for and exercise public power.  
This retreat from inclusive universalism to exclusive identity politics is for Lilla and other 
‘disillusioned liberals like him a marker of the declining commonality of purpose and shared 
values that defined the very idea of the ‘West’ after 1945.64  
     Of course, identity politics is by no means reactionary politics, but strategically is hardly 
likely to offer a solid platform for mobilizing a mass politics, and as such unlikely to enable 
established parties to effectively counter the insurgent mood emerging at the grass roots of 
politics and trading in visceral anger and all manner of social and cultural grievances. To 
respond to marginalized communities and disadvantaged minorities, the anxieties of those 
‘left behind’ by remorseless globalisation is, or can be ethical politics, depending on 
motivation.  However, for the most part this is a politics of self-absorption and personal 
conscience. A fissiparous political culture giving rise to fragmented politics, with all manner 
of ethical and esoteric causes dissipating political energy, rather than aggregating it as 
collective action that connects otherwise diverse social constituencies to a ‘big’ overarching 
political idea. The only way to deliver progressive social change, recover mass support for 
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the social contract rooted in a generic idea of shared fate and common political purpose that 
was the progenitor and the fabric and fundament of the post-war social consensus.65  
     The fragmentation of contemporary liberalism has opened a political space for insurgent 
parties that trade in an altogether more malign politics of cultural identity. Not identity as 
liberal progressives understand the term, but immanent ‘identity’ that speaks not to reflexive 
deliberation, inclusiveness or cultural tolerance but instead to visceral tribalism about ‘we’ or 
‘us’ and that disparages and is contemptuous of ‘other’.66 Developments that even if they 
confirm insurgent politics, are no direct let alone an imminent threat to liberal politics but 
nevertheless confront complacent assumptions about ‘politics as usual’, and as such clear 
indication of a loosening of the cultural moorings of liberal democracy.67 
 
AFTERTHOUGHS 
     Liberal politics can only survive where civility, forbearance and tolerance prevail. Values 
that are increasingly disparaged in the discourse and conduct of politics and the liberal 
democratic order is weaker for it. There is mounting evidence that liberal values are under 
attack, not least from a strident media and even more so on raucous social media whose most 
alarming consequence is the coarsening of political discourse. A readily accessible medium 
for traducing ‘experts’ that deprecates progressive sensibilities as ‘weakness’ or ‘betrayal’ of 
national purpose, and whose style and delivery disregards nuance, disparages moderation, 
subverts the classic liberal norms of mutual respect, and is utterly contemptuous of the 
civility indispensable for liberal and democratic politics. The critical question is whether this 
insurgent challenge can be answered in these tempestuous times and one whose outcome is 
far from certain.  
     Much contemporary political discourse is debased by rancorous disrespect for ‘other’ and 
‘difference’, politics driven more by hate than tolerance. This is, or should be concerning for 
those who regard classic liberal virtues - propriety, forbearance, civility and respect - as 
indispensable for a functioning democratic politics. Contempt for authority whether of 
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government or officialdom, indeed anyone claiming technical proficiency is both widespread 
and encouraged by populist and nativist insurgents everywhere. Due regard for those who 
manage public affairs is abated by visceral contempt that debases the observance of rules, 
procedures and the habitual compromise, without which democratic governance cannot work 
nor liberal politics endure. The challenge for liberal order is to restore faith in politics as the 
‘art of the possible’, measured deliberation and reasoned debate, the rational imperatives of 
political moderation and compromise that have characterised liberal politics from the outset.68  
     How serious is the threat to liberal politics and can public confidence be restored in the 
institutions and procedures of liberal governance? Is presently declining public trust merely 
temporary aberration, a reaction to economic crisis and perceived neglect by remote elites? 
Or is growing disconnect between centrist parties and their erstwhile voters serious and serial 
threat to the balanced and temperate politics that has prevailed in the West throughout the 
post-war decades?  Expedient questions for those who manage public affairs, and while glib 
prediction of an end to the liberal order is on available evidence far-fetched, there can be no 
room for complacency about what Peter Mair (see footnote 11) has described as the growing 
void between governors and governed. Established and mainstream parties remain as the 
principal interlocutors of the public interest, retaining substantial if declining support at the 
ballot box and in opinion surveys that measure political attitudes. Yet public approval for 
these liberal agencies is waning and popular approval for liberal institutions and politics some 
considerable way short of the levels of support achieved in the early post-War decades.69  
     Declining public trust is not attributable to any particular reason or singular event, rather 
more a slow puncture rather than spectacular ‘blow-out’ and as such remedial. That said, 
amongst many instances of failure by governments facing unprecedented challenge in the 
post-war era, mistrust of liberal politics and its governing agencies can be traced back 
directly to monumental incompetence in official responses to the 2008-10 global financial 
and Eurozone crises. Calamitous failures of political leadership, both at the EU and national 
levels, propelled western economies into almost precipitous decline. Economic 
mismanagement made worse by the neo-liberal policies and ideological preferences of 
western governments that imposed harsh austerity on the generality of citizens, including 
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those least able to cope: and with no convincing action by governing elites to justify policy in 
anything remotely resembling authentic liberal values. Events both contingent and structural 
halted, indeed subverted the progressive social contract that has underwritten the post-1945 
liberal order. Insurgent parties have marketed this to prospective supporters as an 
unparalleled betrayal of public trust, and a charge difficult to counter in light of the sheer 
audacity of elected governments converting by default bankers’ reckless accumulation of 
private debt into public mega-debt, and without anything remotely resembling democratic 
consent or public accountability.  
     The EU’s feeble response to the Eurozone crisis, followed soon after by political paralysis 
in Brussels and national governments alike in the face of mass migration across its southern 
border has merely intensified the sense of liberal malaise. A crisis for sure, although hardly 
yet a terminal one, even though these events have wrought considerable damage on public 
trust in liberal values and institutions. In the process, eroding that commonality of purpose 
and shared endeavour that has been the cultural anchor of liberal politics since1945. There is 
widespread disconnection between the political classes and those whom they govern that 
contributes to growing cynicism about the values, norms and procedures that have long been 
the cultural and ideological mainstays of liberal politics.70 This may not be liberalisms end 
game but it ought to be a wake-up call, serious enough shock to the fundaments of the 
Western liberal order and one to be confronted and addressed if the norms, values and policy 
preferences that have long defined liberal internationalism are to survive these capricious 
times. Crisis in the liberal order there may well be, but to characterise this as the ‘end of the 
West’ is an apocalyptic prospect and surely an exaggerated one. Liberal politics is indeed 
facing serious challenges on both sides of the Atlantic.  
     The marked shift in the trajectory of international events reviewed in this paper has 
obliged the western liberal order to set aside its claim to be the singular paradigm for 
structuring global politics or economics. Nevertheless, liberal values and democratic politics 
continue to appeal, retaining deep-seated cultural resonance for many, indeed most 
inhabitants of the Atlantic basin. If the liberal international order that is ‘The West’ is to 
recover its ethical appeal and practical purpose as a fair and practicable system for 
distributing private and public goods amongst the alternative and competing paradigms of 
globalization, those who conduct its affairs must assimilate these rising challenges and make 
                                                          




fitting response. Do things differently, rebuild consensus, recover public trust by balancing 
the interests of private capital, non-accountable technocrats and the wider public interest. In 
effect, to reinstate the social contract installed after 1945 after the catharsis of world war and 
that spoke to wearied and defeated peoples: in the process, firmly recovering public trust in 
liberal values and democratic governance so badly impaired by the reactionary politics and 
social chaos that inflicted two world wars in barely a generation. The present task for a liberal 
order and its elites is no less urgent: to recover liberal purpose and build anew that contract 
between governors and governed, the better to respond to the tumult of present times.  
 
 
 
 
